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Summary  
The influence of corporate activities on violent conflict has received widespread attention, 
though almost exclusively because of negative effects, particularly those caused by the 
extractive industries. At the same time, politicians and researchers recently raised expec-
tations of corporate actions in a globalized world. Corporations are assumed to function 
as partners not only in economic development and poverty alleviation, but also in estab-
lishing peace and security. However, company contributions to conflict prevention, con-
flict resolution, and post-conflict peacebuilding, have hardly been scientifically investi-
gated. Consequently, there is a notable discrepancy between expectations of corporate 
contributions to governance in conflict zones, and conceptual and empirical knowledge.  
Against this background, this report asks how corporations contribute to peace and 
security in zones of violent conflict and proposes an analytical approach to describe the 
contributions. The report seeks to draw more general conclusions on the potential of cor-
porate contributions towards peace and security by analyzing four company case studies. 
These case studies cover several industry sectors and conflict zones. Company Alpha (a 
pseudonym) belongs to the food & beverage industry in Rwanda, Studiosus is a tourist 
company operating in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, Kuehne+Nagel is a logistics 
company in Northern Ireland, and Shell is the largest oil company operating in Nigeria.  
Governance involves sustained corporate policies and activities that work towards the 
creation and implementation of collectively binding rules and norms and provision of 
collective goods. Codes of conduct, policy documents or sustainability reports usually 
include a company’s policies on important governance topics, such as human rights, anti-
corruption, labor rights or environmental protection. A review of a company’s activities 
and behavior shows whether the corporation actually does what it declares.  
Corporate engagement can have varying relevance to peace and security: actual con-
tributions to security governance; governance contributions to other policy fields related 
to establishing peace and security; and governance contributions that are not related to 
the provision of peace and security. Security governance directly addresses the level of 
violence in conflict zones. In this case, security is defined in a classical and narrow way. 
Additionally, the authors draw on literature on conflict prevention and peacebuilding to 
identify policy fields that are commonly considered important when addressing the issues 
related to violent conflict. Three such dimensions were identified: (a) political order, (b) 
socio-economic governance, and (c) the socio-cultural sphere. 
This framework was applied to the four company case studies. A comparison of the 
cases shows that one of the companies currently has a policy in place directly relating to 
security governance. Companies mainly contribute to the other policy fields relevant to 
peace and security through their policies and behavior, particularly in the ‘political order’ 
and ‘socio-economic’ dimensions. Concerning ‘political order’, companies mainly have 
policies and activities about (1) human and labor rights, and (2) anti-corruption and 
transparency. Companies also contribute to governance in the following socio-economic 
 II 
policy fields: (1) environmental standards, (2) community development, and (3) equal 
distribution of economic goods.  
Why do we find such an accumulation of corporate engagement in the socio-
economic and political order dimensions? Research indicates that corporations contribute 
most to governance in those areas that relate to their core expertise and resources. This 
expertise would also give some legitimacy to their governance contributions as they are 
more clearly in a position to contribute to problem solving. This is particularly the case 
with ‘socio-economic’ activities, where companies might perceive their expertise to be 
strongest, though even political order (e.g. fighting corruption and enhancing transpar-
ency) relates to good corporate governance to some extent. Interestingly, companies 
themselves often do not consider their contribution to issues in the socio-economic field, 
such as community development or income generation, to be a ‘political’ activity. In con-
trast, contributing to political order seems to be more sensitive (e.g. addressing human 
rights issues). 
Several reasons might explain why companies are reluctant to engage in security gov-
ernance: Firstly, the provision of security is considered to be at the core of state responsi-
bilities; engaging in security provision would then result in a deep entrapment in pro-
cesses that are regarded as highly political and sensitive governmental responsibilities. All 
companies perceive profit making as their priority; through their policies and activities 
they seek to support host societies and governments but not to substitute them. Secondly, 
companies may lack the expertise and capacity to engage in issues directly linked to secu-
rity governance. A company’s main concern is usually managing the security of their own 
operations. Providing more encompassing security for a conflict region would overextend 
the capacities and resources that companies have at their disposal. Thirdly, engagement in 
security governance might depend on the intensity and proximity of the conflict to a 
company’s operation. The higher the level of violence and the more a company is affected 
by conflict, the more likely companies will engage if they want to continue their opera-
tions.  
In summary, the findings suggest that companies do contribute to peace and security. 
However, they are limited in scope and in the issues they address, and yet diverse in ap-
plied standards. Thus, if policy frameworks and strategies continue to assume that the 
private sector is a governance partner in conflict zones it may lead to a rude awakening 
when the private partner turns out to be incapable or unwilling to fulfill this role. Instead 
of merely relying on corporate governance contributions to peace and security, policy 
makers are recommended to review where and under which conditions such interven-
tions have successfully taken place. The question of what is keeping corporations from 
becoming more involved also needs to be asked, ideally through honest dialogue with 
corporations. This will help clarify expectations and assumptions about corporate contri-
butions to peace and security.  
 
  
Contents 
 
 
1. Introduction 1 
2. Corporate governance contributions to peace and security 4 
3. Evidence from company case studies 8 
3.1 The food and beverage industry in Rwanda 9 
3.2 Kuehne+Nagel in Northern Ireland 14 
3.3 Studiosus in Israel/Palestinian Territories 19 
3.4 Shell in Nigeria 24 
3.5 Comparison of case studies 30 
4. Conclusion and recommendations 32 
4.1 Clarifying expectations for and consequences of 
corporate engagement 32 
4.2. The need for a coordinated strategy of public actors 33 
5. References 35 
 
Abbreviations 39 
 

  
1. Introduction1 
In 1997, the French oil company Elf Aquitaine was revealed to have supported both sides 
of the civil war in the Republic of Congo in order to secure its operations in the country 
in case of a change of government: it paid taxes to the government for its oil concessions 
while at the same time supporting the private militia of the former president Denis Sassou 
Ngessou. Elf Aquitaine additionally faced allegations of directly facilitating arms ship-
ments to the country. The problem of companies’ involvement in violent conflicts was 
further emphasized by a United Nations (UN) Panel of Experts in 2001, which was the 
first formal UN report to explicitly name companies after stating that “the role of private 
companies and individuals has also been vital” for “the continuation of the conflict” (UN 
Panel of Experts 2001: para 181). Economies of violence have received a lot of attention, 
as has the profit from war that some individuals, organizations and companies make. 
Peace researchers, analysts and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have revealed 
transnational companies as being part of the problem of civil war. Detailed analyses have 
shown how multinational companies contribute to destabilization in zones of violent 
conflict, and how they prolong and finance conflict, or even profit from it, essentially by 
linking local conflict drivers to global assets (Ganser 2004: 64-69; Berdal/Malone 2000: 
11f.; Ballentine/Nitzschke 2004).  
At the same time, equitable economic development and private investment are under-
stood to be a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for transforming fragile states into 
more stable countries and fostering sustaining peace. Companies provide tax revenues for 
governments and income to local populations or marginalized groups. Once companies 
are operating in developing countries and zones of violent conflict, many NGOs would 
like to see their behavior subject to binding regulation, but they increasingly accept com-
panies’ voluntary engagement as a second best solution. This has led to the development 
of different tool kits to raise companies’ awareness about their behavioral options – how 
they can operate in a conflict-sensitive manner and ensure benefits for their host societies, 
e.g. by preventing corruption or offering fair employment conditions (Banfield et al. 2003; 
Nelson 2000; Corporate Engagement Project2). Beyond conflict-sensitive business prac-
tices, companies or their representatives have actively supported peace processes in South 
Africa, Guatemala and Sri Lanka, amongst others, by facilitating negotiations between par-
ties to the conflict, actively lobbying for peaceful solutions to conflicts or simply providing 
logistics and finances for parties to the conflict to safely meet and talk (Banfield et al. 2006, 
 
 
1 The project, The Role of Transnational Corporations in Conflict Zones, at the Peace Research Institute 
Frankfurt, is supported by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung and partially by the German Foundation for Peace 
Research. We thank Una Becker, Nicole Deitelhoff, Anna Geis, Thorsten Gromes, Peter Kreuzer, Bern-
hard Moltmann, and Klaus Dieter Wolf for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this report. We 
thank Jessica Seiler for her research assistance. 
2 www.cdainc.com/cep (11.03.2008). 
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Joras 2007). Economic integration of ex-combatants is essential for the success of any de-
mobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program, and in return depends on 
job creation and economic development, ideally through the private sector (Gerson 2000).  
As these negative and positive examples of corporate activities and roles indicate, cor-
porate operations in zones of violent conflict cannot be judged as contributing solely to 
either conflict or peace.  
The Global Governance3 debate emphasizes positive contributions by companies to 
the solutions of societal problems. It is assumed that different actors, such as states and 
international organizations, civil society organizations, and business, are involved in 
processes of governance. One important discussion is how these different actors contrib-
ute to the provision of collective goods at the global, national and local levels. Having 
been the ‘bad guys’ in the past, multinational corporations are now accepted as actors that 
have the potential to govern and therefore research should openly investigate their gov-
ernance contributions (Wolf et al. 2007: 295).  
Another important driver of the debate on positive corporate contributions to peace 
and security is the significant increase in attention given to Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity (CSR). The CSR agenda has become increasingly influential, expanding from envi-
ronmental consequences of corporate operations to include other issues such as the hu-
man rights situations of stakeholders (Ruggie 2007). Corporations are increasingly in-
volved in developing and committing to codes of conduct, joint standards, and guidelines, 
as for example in the framework of the Global Reporting Initiative or the Global Com-
pact.4 Standard setting and implementation occur in areas such as technical standards, 
environmental protection, labor standards, human rights and corruption. 
Considering these developments and the private sector’s reputation of being efficient, 
powerful and creative in solving problems, increasing expectations have been formulated 
by international organizations, governments, and NGOs, as well as companies them-
selves, of a contribution from business in zones of violent conflict. The United Nations 
Global Compact established its first policy dialogue “The Role of the Private Sector in 
Zones of Conflict” in 2001. The role of corporations was also highlighted in the UN Secre-
tary-General’s report on conflict prevention in 2003, recognizing that companies are 
powerful players in situations of conflict (United Nations 2003). In 2004, the role of busi-
ness in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction was discussed 
 
 
3 For an overview on Global Governance research see Dingwerth/Pattberg (2006). 
4 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) develops and disseminates globally applicable sustainability report-
ing guidelines (www.globalreporting.org). The UN Global Compact was initiated in 1990 and is a frame-
work for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally ac-
cepted principles in the areas of human and labor rights, the environment and anti-corruption. It has al-
most 6,000 company participants. (www.unglobalcompact.org) 
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during an open debate of the United Nations Security Council.5 During the same year the 
German Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict 
Peace-Building” mentioned the growing importance of responsible corporate engagement 
for crisis prevention (Die Bundesregierung 2004: 21f.). The OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) published a “Risk Awareness Tool for Multi-
national Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones” (OECD 2006) and the Group of 8 (G8) 
has taken up the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility in their declaration on “Growth 
and Responsibility in the World Economy” during the Heiligendamm Summit in 2007.  
Even companies themselves now formulate expectations of their role in public gover-
nance. A recent report of the World Economic Forum highlights that companies have 
much to gain from strengthening public governance and that companies should “include 
public governance approaches in corporate responsibility and corporate global citizenship 
strategies” with the aim to help remedy bad governance, strengthen weak governance and 
develop global governance (World Economic Forum 2008: 6-12).  
Research on business in zones of violent conflict is lagging behind the political debate, 
which expects corporations to play some positive role in zones of violent conflict. Peace 
research has remained largely silent on the potentially positive role of companies, though 
a skeptical attitude towards companies’ conflict solving capacities and willingness pre-
vails. Currently there is only limited knowledge about how companies behave in zones of 
violent conflict and their potentially positive role.6 This report seeks to contribute to fill-
ing this existing gap by looking at companies from different industry sectors operating in 
areas currently or formerly affected by violent conflict. This will help to assess whether 
expectations about the corporate role in governance formulated in the political debate are 
justified or not. This paper focuses on companies’ governance contributions to peace and 
security in zones of violent conflict. By comparing company case studies the report in-
tends to draw some more general conclusions on the potential of corporate contributions 
towards peace and security.  
The report is structured as follows: the second chapter discusses how companies can 
contribute to governance in zones of violent conflict. They can do so through their poli-
cies and behavior in different policy fields, ranging from security and political order to 
socio-economic and socio-cultural issues. In the third chapter, four company case studies 
are analyzed. The case study of a transnational corporation (TNC) in Rwanda discusses 
the corporation’s sophisticated code of ethics which has been taken up by other private 
 
 
5 The debate was initiated by the German Presidency of the Council, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/ 
sc8058.doc.htm (13.05.2008). 
6 We acknowledge that there are some notable contributions to the debate about business in zones of vio-
lent conflict from academics as well as from more policy-oriented circles. Academic contributions to the 
field include Haufler (2001), Wenger/Möckli (2003), Fort/Schipani (2004) or Ballentine/Nitzschke (2005). 
Examples for policy-oriented studies can be found in the work of International Alert (Nelson 2000; 
Banfield et al. 2003) and the Corporate Engagement Project (www.cdainc.com/cep, 11.03.2008). 
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and public actors, as well as its cooperation with subsistence farmers to secure both its 
own supply and the farmers’ livelihoods. A logistics company in Northern Ireland reveals 
strong commitments to fair and equal employment. A company from the tourist industry 
in the Palestinian Territories and Israel tries to balance benefits between the parties to the 
conflict, thus addressing economic inequalities. The fourth case study is of an oil industry 
company in Nigeria who also addresses economic inequalities through its community 
development programs and additionally commits to the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights. The comparative analysis of these four case studies shows that com-
panies contribute to peace and security through a variety of policies and activities by ad-
dressing issues related to political order and socio-economic development. One of these 
four corporations is currently directly involved in security governance. Some assumptions 
about why companies rarely directly engage in security governance will be discussed. As-
sumptions include that companies might perceive their expertise to be strongest in the 
socio-economic policy fields and that security is considered to be at the core of govern-
mental responsibilities, where companies either do not want to interfere or do not feel 
competent. Collectively, these findings point to the limits and the opportunities of corpo-
rate contributions, which will be discussed in chapter 4. To transform these opportunities 
into productive engagement several measures have to be taken. One important step is that 
policy makers formulate a clear vision of the role of businesses in zones of violent conflict.  
2. Corporate governance contributions to peace and security 
Companies might simply do business and stimulate economic growth and development. 
However, doing business is not a neutral activity, but an activity that might have negative 
and positive consequences for the societal environment. We are therefore interested in 
how companies do business, how they engage beyond their intrinsic business interest and 
whether they take over governance functions.  
Companies usually frame their societal engagement in developing countries and areas 
of violent conflict as CSR. CSR can be considered as part of the larger Global Governance 
agenda in that it discusses the responsibilities of corporations within and beyond their 
core business operations. Compared to corporate business activities and CSR, governance 
is marked by a certain political quality. It involves sustained corporate policies and activi-
ties that work towards the creation and implementation of collectively binding rules and 
norms and the provision of collective good. This also means that we are not interested in 
internal company measures, but rather in policies and activities that reach beyond the 
factory gates. Some CSR activities, such as the development of industry-wide environ-
mental standards, may therefore be considered as governance contributions according to 
this analytical distinction, while other CSR activities, such as a one-off philanthropic 
payment to an environmental fund, are not governance as applied in this sense.  
Another important characteristic of governance contributions is intentionality: gov-
ernance is order plus intentionality (Rosenau 1992: 5). Governance contributions are 
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defined by their intention to solve or alleviate societal problems. Therefore, we are not 
interested in corporate contributions that are merely by-products of companies’ business 
operations.7 Companies do not make a contribution to governance by ‘just doing busi-
ness’ in a zone of violent conflict. But how can we identify whether the behavior of corpo-
rations is intended or not? We assume that observed contributions are intentional if they 
were formerly declared in a statement of intention, for example a corporate code of con-
duct, a speech given by the chief executive officer (CEO), or a project outline. Both for 
assessing intentionality and for the aim of this report, the motivation of corporate behav-
ior is not important. For our analysis it does not make any difference whether corporate 
contributions are driven by market rationality or an intrinsic ethical motivation, or a mix-
ture of both.  
According to our understanding, policies and activities beyond the law in the country 
of operation clearly constitute positive governance contributions in a conflict zone. Com-
panies making no commitments and/or showing behavior not in compliance with the law 
do not contribute to governance. Commitments and behavior in compliance with the law 
are ambiguous. If behavior is mandated by law and these laws are enforced by the gov-
ernment, companies’ policies and activities cannot be considered as governance contribu-
tions. However, in many zones of violent conflict states are not able or willing to imple-
ment the law. Indeed, this failure has led to the call for private actors to become involved 
in governance in the first place. Where governments are not able or willing to implement 
a legal framework, a company that makes reference to existing laws and shows behavior 
in compliance with these laws makes a voluntary and independent contribution to gov-
ernance. With this analytical approach, we can place corporate policies and activities 
along a continuum that ranges from no governance contributions to high and positive 
governance contributions.8 
The focus of this report is companies’ governance contributions that are relevant to 
peace and security. Having discussed how we identify governance contributions, we must 
therefore also consider how to identify whether they directly or indirectly contribute to 
peace and security in a zone of violent conflict. We use the term ‘conflict zone’ to denote 
an area affected by violent conflict. The term zone is used because it can refer to an entire 
country (e.g. Rwanda), a region within a state (e.g. Northern Ireland or the Niger Delta), 
or a transboundary area (e.g. Israel and Palestinian Territories).9  
 
 
7 For a different point of view see Wenger/Möckli (2003). 
8 At this point it is important to remember that companies might equally behave in ways that take advan-
tage of gaps in regulatory frameworks or the turmoil of a conflict context. As stated above, this issue has 
already received a lot of attention; the main interest here is instead to fill the empirical gap about the gov-
ernance contributions of companies (see Chapter 1). 
9 The conflicts that were of interest to this research are societal rather than criminal and are characterized 
by a certain level of physical violence. According to Wallensteen, “conflict consists of three components: 
action, incompatibility and actors. Combining them we arrive at a complete definition of a conflict as a 
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Numerous factors influence the emergence and the persistence of violent conflicts. In 
many cases the state’s existence and monopoly on the use of force is challenged by either 
another state or societal groups within the state. Another set of contributing factors is 
governmental oppression in order to prohibit secession or regional autonomy. This is 
often accompanied by human rights violations, censorship or unfair elections. Economic 
discrimination and marginalization on the basis of political and ethnic groupings and 
ecological devastation often increase cleavages between groups and contribute to violent 
confrontations or the persistence of violence. Governance contributions to peace and 
security are of interest as they are often not provided by the state in zones of violent con-
flict. Corporate engagement effects peace and security in many ways, for example, 
through (1) direct contributions to security governance; and (2) governance contributions 
to other policy fields which address the underlying issues of a given violent conflict. A 
third category are governance contributions not related to the provision of peace and 
security, which are not further investigated in this report.  
(1) Contributions to security governance refer to governance contributions by compa-
nies that directly address the level of violence in zones of violent conflict. In this sense, secu-
rity governance refers to issues such as security sector reform, as well as disarmament, de-
mobilization and reintegration efforts. It might also include corporate involvement in peace 
negotiations and the handling of public and private security forces, where this affects a 
broader public or communities (Bell/Watson 2006; Brzoska 2003; Wulf 2004).  
(2) Governance contributions to other policy fields: The literature on conflict prevention 
and peacebuilding can be used to identify policy fields and issues that are commonly con-
sidered to address the factors that are intertwined with the persistence of violent conflict. 
Three of these dimensions that are relevant for peace and security in a broader sense were 
identified: (a) political order, (b) socio-economic governance, and (c) socio-cultural sphere 
(Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 1997; Lund 2002; Schneckener 
2005). 
a) The dimension of political order broadly refers to establishing a system of institutions 
and rules. It provides basic freedoms for citizens, participation in political processes, and 
establishes limits to the exercise of power (cf. Rittberger/Zangl 2006: 121). In this dimen-
sion, governance contributions might aim at promoting the rule of law or the protection 
and promotion of human rights. Moreover, it includes the participation in political 
processes (e.g. through elections), the promotion of civil society10, the issues of anti-
 
 
social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time 
an available set of scarce resources” (2002: 16). And: “What counts is the use of violence. [...] It covers 
conflicts from a threshold level of 25 battle-related deaths in a year” (2002:. 24).” (Wallensteen 2002: 16-
24). Conflict zone, in our definition, encompasses the situation during and after violent escalations.  
10 We use the term civil society to denote “the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, 
purposes and values”, distinct from the state, family, and market. Examples include development non-
governmental organizations, advocacy groups, community groups, women’s organizations, and social 
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corruption and transparency as well as free and independent media (Schneckener 2005: 
21; Champain 2002: 150; Howard 2005). All these factors can be regarded as conditions 
for parties to the conflict not to resort to violence because they have opportunities to 
control the government’s exercise of its power and different channels to voice their con-
cerns.  
b) The socio-economic dimension covers “the generation and distribution of material 
wealth” (Rittberger/Zangl 2006: 121; Schneckener 2005: 21). This includes measures to 
transform war economies by generating economic prospects with means other than the 
use of violence. It also includes activities to combat poverty and social inequalities, as 
well as promote economic development and generate income, especially in marginalized 
groups and where they can bridge social divides. In terms of this, access to health and 
education are further factors facilitating economic opportunities (Verstegen 2001). Ad-
ditionally, the management of the environment and natural resources is an issue of this 
dimension through its connection to livelihoods and state income (Collier et al. 2003). 
This dimension therefore encompasses economic grievances and the unequal distribu-
tion of economic goods, which can be an important source of conflict. 
c) The socio-cultural dimension includes all those activities that address the legacies of 
violent conflict and aim to establish a culture of peace. This includes reconciliation ini-
tiatives and peace education (Assefa 2001; Vienings 2001). These activities might help 
reduce prejudices resulting from the violent conflict and allow members of the former 
parties to the violent conflict to solve conflicts with words instead of weapons. 
This very broad understanding of governance contributions related to peace and security 
risks the creation of an all inclusive concept that considers everything as being related to 
violent conflict. Therefore, these policy fields are reviewed for each specific conflict to 
assess which ones are of relevance to address the specific underlying issues of a given vio-
lent conflict. For example, a sophisticated environmental policy involving water provision 
to a broader community is only considered a governance contribution relevant to peace 
and security if access to and distribution of water are linked to the emergence or persis-
tence of the specific conflict under review.  
 
 
movements. (London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society, www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what 
_is_civil_society.htm, 10.07.2008). Civil society is closely linked to an active citizenry and has a vital func-
tion in establishing a political order and democracy as it helps to hold governments accountable. In using 
the term civil society, we are not referring to “bad” or “uncivil” civil society, such as illicit, terrorist, or 
criminal organizations.  
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Table 1: Corporate Governance Contributions 
Corporate Governance Contributions in Zones of Violent Conflict 
Security Governance Other Fields of Governance relevant to Peace and Security 
Security 
(1) 
Political order 
(2) 
Socio-economic dimension 
(3) 
Socio-cultural dimension 
(4) 
 
According to the condition of intentionality mentioned above, corporate governance 
contributions do not have to aim directly at providing security. However, the intention of 
the corporate behavior must be to address the fields of political order, socio-economic 
and socio-cultural issues, which can then plausibly be linked to peace and security on the 
basis of existing research. 
3. Evidence from company case studies 
In the following chapter we present case studies on four companies operating in zones of 
violent conflict. Company Alpha (a pseudonym) belongs to the food & beverage industry 
in Rwanda. Kuehne+Nagel is a logistics company in Northern Ireland. Studiosus is a 
tourism company that operates in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Shell is the largest 
oil company operating in Nigeria.  
The companies were selected to cover a wide variety of industry sectors and zones of 
violent conflict. More general conclusions will be generated by analyzing two companies 
from the service sector (logistics and tourism) and two from production industries (food 
& beverages and oil). All four companies operate in regions that have suffered or are suf-
fering from violent conflicts. Two conflicts with different levels of violence and causes of 
conflict were chosen from Sub-Saharan Africa. To avoid drawing biased conclusions from 
a single world region, two other conflict regions have been selected: Israel/Palestinian 
Territories and Northern Ireland. Compared to the African cases, companies operating in 
these two zones of violent conflict are confronted with very different political and societal 
environments: Northern Ireland represents a highly regulated setting within the Euro-
pean Union. Israel and the Palestinian Territories is a conflict zone where companies are 
confronted with contrasting regulatory settings. The criteria for selecting the different 
companies are introduced in the following sections. The focus in the following short case 
studies is on describing and analyzing companies’ governance contributions. Due to the 
limited space available, the conflict context will be introduced rather cursorily. 
There is some positive bias in the case selection; companies that provide information 
about their operations and engagement in zones of violent conflict are mostly those who 
show some kind of positive engagement.  
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The information in each case study is based on several sources, including companies’ 
own reporting (sustainability reports, annual reports and gray literature), interviews with 
company representatives at headquarters and local operations in conflict zones, interviews 
with stakeholders, and other sources, such as media articles and civil society reports. 
3.1 The food and beverage industry in Rwanda 
The conflict zone: Rwanda11 
Towards the end of Belgian colonial rule, the systematic deprivation of economical, social 
and political power suffered by the Hutu majority in Rwanda led to a civil war against the 
ruling Tutsi elite. The division between the two groups was strongly antagonized during 
German and then Belgian colonial rule.12 Ethnic tensions marked by repeated violence, 
especially during independence in the 1960s and 1990s13, led to a civil war which began in 
1990 and culminated in genocide during 1994. An estimated 800,000 Tutsi, moderate 
Hutu and indigenous Twa were massacred in only a few weeks (Debiel 2002).14 The Tutsi-
led Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) from Uganda, based in Northern Rwanda since the 
civil war, invaded the rest of the country and ended the genocide. Expecting revenge, both 
génocidaires and innocent Hutu crossed the border into the former Zaire (now the De-
mocratic Republic of Congo, DRC) and other countries in a mass exodus. From Zaire, the 
Rwandan Liberation Democratic Forces (FDLR) led incursions into Rwanda that contin-
ued to cause casualties and insecurity in the western province of Rwanda. In the second 
half of the 1990s, the conflict relocated to the eastern DRC (International Panel of Emi-
nent Persons 2000). Rwanda now enjoys a high degree of security, which is considered a 
beneficial investment factor. For the purpose of this case study, the phase of the build-up 
to the genocide and the post-war development until 2007 is considered. 
In the run-up to the genocide, radical branches of the Rwandan government system-
atically exploited the socio-economic divide between the Hutu and Tutsi for political agi-
tation. The government was further marked by a high level of corruption. The Freedom 
 
 
11 For a comprehensive account of the background and events regarding violent conflict in Rwanda, see the 
International Panel of Eminent Persons report “The Preventable Genocide” endorsed by the 36th Ordi-
nary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of the African Un-
ion, held in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000 (International Panel of Eminent Persons 2000). 
12 In the pre-colonial feudal system, the Tutsi represented the ruling elite and royal family, sharing the same 
language and culture with the Hutu. The German colonial power associated each group with superior and 
inferior ethnic and ‘racial’ characteristics, which was further enforced by the Belgian authorities by intro-
ducing ethnicity-based identity cards, enforcing racial quota that disadvantaged the Hutu and Twa.  
13 www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/kriege_archiv.htm (12.12.2007). 
14 The international community failed to make the appropriate decisions and take steps to end the violence 
of 1994. 
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House Index considers Rwanda ‘not free’ in terms of civil and political rights, as impor-
tant NGOs are oppressed because of the claim that they spread genocide ideology.15 Since 
1994, the government’s stance on anti-corruption has been stringent and has resulted in 
continuous improvement on the World Bank Governance Indicators16, though corrup-
tion remains an issue. Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Combined with its hilly terrain, traditional small-scale farming and property 
rights, this fact puts significant pressure on livelihoods in rural area and conflicts between 
land uses, such as pastoral versus agricultural. The issue of competition over land, land 
ownership and the resulting division of socio-economic privilege was exploited to mobi-
lize the genocide (Wyss 2006: 8-17). 
Background on the industry and company 
Alpha (a pseudonym) is a production company in the food and beverage industry. The 
company’s parent group, Beta (also a pseudonym), has a corporate policy stipulating ano-
nymity in all research endeavors, which is guarded here by not elaborating in detail upon 
the industry and company. Alpha has nevertheless been very cooperative in providing 
access to interview partners at different levels and locations. Alpha has a long history of 
operating in Rwanda, first investing prior to independence. 
Alpha has been a top national tax payer for a long time and in 2007 directly employed 
570 people, ensuring income for many more subcontractors in distribution, logistics and 
supply.17 In this industry, Africa is a small but growing market, with low income levels 
presenting the main barrier to market development. The industry sector is also character-
ized by high sunk costs and long-term investments: establishing a production site not 
only requires considerable financial investment and some skilled labor, but also a well-
organized supply chain for raw materials and distribution. Alpha is a majority subsidiary 
of Group Beta, which is one of the top five global industry leaders, with a net profit 
(BEIA) of € 930 million and 57,557 employees (pro rata) in 2006.  
Main governance contributions  
Alpha engages in an array of governance contributions to policy fields that are relevant to 
peace and security. Due to restricted space in this paper, only a selection of those is pre-
sented here. Contributions without even an indirect link to peace and security (based on a 
conflict analysis) have been omitted. 
 
 
15 www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7259 (28.04.2008). Since 2003 Rwan-
da has returned to its pre-genocide ranking by Freedom House, indicating a slight upward trend since the 
genocide, but remaining within the ‘not-free’ category. 
16 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp (28.04.2008). 
17 Alpha plans to carry out an ‘economic impact assessment’ to identify the exact economic and employ-
ment impact of its operations. 
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Security governance 
Alpha rejects any involvement in what is conceptualized as ‘security governance’ above. It 
considers security provision beyond its own facilities and employees at work the respon-
sibility of the public or ‘political’ domain.18 The company employs an internal member of 
staff as security officer. They deal with internal security issues and work with a security 
service provider, but do not engage in wider security topics or concerns. This passive 
stance is supported by anecdotal evidence: in 1998 after a brutal attack on a bus carrying 
employees (36 dead, 27 injured), the company merely took internal measures, notably 
stopping the night shift, while buses to transport employees were guarded by the public 
police (interviews with company representatives). The company refrained, for example, 
from commissioning security providers to secure the border with the DRC. Instead, it 
made the government in Kigali aware of its own security problem, since cutting the night 
shift means less production and lower tax generation for the government. 
Governance contributions to other policy fields relevant to peace and security 
Alpha actively contributes to governance in other policy fields in Rwanda. The company 
reveals policy commitments and engagement beyond host state law in the realm of ‘politi-
cal order’. The company’s parent group provides their Human Rights policy (no date) on 
its website. The policy endorses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and states 
that it “will not cooperate, actively or passively, directly or indirectly, in any violation of 
human rights” and that it “support[s its] employees if third parties violate their rights”. 
Against the background of genocide, a clear stance on human rights can be one way of 
promoting peace. By publishing this policy in all countries of operation it wants to ensure 
that all employees are aware of their rights. The Human Rights policy is re-referenced and 
expanded in other policy documents, such as the Group Supplier Code (2005), which 
contains a human rights section, and working conditions (health and safety, working 
hours, etc.), allowance for negotiations leading to collective agreements, and a rejection of 
child, forced or bonded labor. Similarly, the law within the country of operation is strictly 
adhered to by the Group: “[Alpha] is committed to comply with local laws and regula-
tions, but also to act in accordance with its own values and principles”. This way of oper-
ating has been demonstrated in several situations. For example, Alpha reacted to the dis-
appearance of some employees in Rwanda in 1998 by submitting a formal request to lo-
cate them and determine what allegations were being made against them. By writing let-
ters pointing to official, legal procedures, the clandestine arrests were brought to light, 
informing relatives of where the accused where being held and what allegations were be-
ing brought against them. The company then retreated again, merely keeping a close eye 
on the trial (as described in interviews with company representatives). Arguably, the eco-
 
 
18 Alpha’s code of ethics forbids any involvement with political (or religious) parties, e.g. through sponsor-
ship. It therefore refrains from activities it considers ‘political’. 
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nomic significance of Alpha would have given it some leverage to lobby the release of its 
employees, but instead the behavior of Alpha supported the state’s monopoly of violence 
and rule of law, important building blocks for peace in Rwanda.   
A strict and transparent implementation of the law is also seen as an important way to 
curb corruption. The issue of corruption is generally taken seriously by Alpha and im-
plemented in all areas of work: recruitment follows a predefined standard which includes 
a test and interviews. The formal, written test of knowledge and skills required for vacan-
cies is considered a mechanism to combat favoritism and nepotism. Similarly, suppliers 
are informed prior to submitting an offer that corruption will not be tolerated and their 
offer will be considered by a transparently-organized panel of senior company representa-
tives. Alpha considers itself to be a corruption-free company and enjoys a reputation of 
taking anti-corruption seriously, though it cannot ensure 100 percent adherence at all 
times in practice. Alpha’s stringent implementation of its anti-corruption rule could be 
seen as contribution to governance, as it reaches beyond the company to all subcontrac-
tors and it shows a strong, visible commitment by one of Rwanda’s most significant pri-
vate sector representatives.  
Alpha’s code of ethics (2006) covers the topics of corruption, fraud prevention, con-
flict of interest, gifts, utilization of company property, chain aspects (i.e. supply chain 
management), donations and assistance, publicity/sponsorship, child labor and consulta-
tion (information about and questions on the code), as well as recruitment and staff rela-
tions, as the example above shows. Staff, suppliers and distributors participate in presen-
tations and question and answer sessions on the code of ethics. All staff members receive 
a copy of the code and the alcohol policy (supplied in English, French and Kinyarwanda) 
and have to sign both to confirm that they understand and adhere to these policies. Alpha 
is further seeking to spread the adoption of such codes through the director’s role in the 
national manufacturers’ association, Association of Industries in Rwanda19. It responds 
positively to other companies’ requests and questions regarding the code. Alpha was the 
first company to launch a code of ethics in Rwanda. It is widely believed to have influ-
enced the government’s move to also launch a code of ethics for government officials.  
In summary, the amount and quality of Alpha’s policies regarding ‘political order’ is 
exceptional in the Rwandan context and covers core areas of human rights, law and 
transparency/corruption. They are accompanied by practical and concrete implementa-
tion processes which appear to generally be effective. Furthermore, their scope is broad-
ened to include stakeholders and interested third parties, additionally increasing the po-
tential for their effectiveness from a governance point of view. The policies are indirectly 
linked to peace as they strengthen rights and laws, and thus provide a non-violent means 
for conflict settlement. 
 
 
19 The members of this manufacturing association are local tea and coffee growers, apart from company 
Alpha. 
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In socio-economic governance contributions, Alpha pursues CSR activities related to 
health, education and the environment, ranging from the sponsoring of a school in the ad-
jacent community (building, teaching materials, etc.) to tree-planting activities and dona-
tions to relief funds. Of these activities, some are more systematic and sustained and are 
therefore considered governance contributions. One prominent example is the way Alpha 
integrates local economic development into its core business activities by sourcing local 
products from small-scale farmers who are organized in cooperatives. The company ac-
quires local agricultural produce, supplying the seeds to the farmers and guaranteeing pur-
chase of the crop at a fixed price, which is slightly above the going market price. The com-
pany also implemented a scheme for 5,500 farmers and their dependents (a total of 35,000 
people) to join the national health insurance scheme, Mutuelle de santé. In the first year of 
this three-year scheme, the company joined forces with a European NGO and the farmers’ 
cooperatives to support the farmers’ families to pay for their health insurance. In the second 
year the farmers and Alpha jointly paid the contributions, while the farmers take full re-
sponsibility for their own contributions in the third and following years. While Alpha 
clearly requires the agricultural produce for its own production, it could arguably procure 
more easily by purchasing it from neighboring countries. At the same time, this scheme 
allows the company to better control the quality of the grain, an important asset of the 
company’s own product. The expansion of the scheme to include the ‘Mutuelle de santé’ 
component certainly reaches beyond core business activity and contributes to the health of 
suppliers and their families. The health situation in general does not particularly relate to 
the conflict in Rwanda. This scheme, however, increases life expectancy and supports the 
very basic livelihood and security of the rural poor, a particularly marginalized group. It 
therefore targets a socio-economic divide which was exploited during the genocide. 
While Alpha has a broad portfolio of socio-economic activities, its supply chain devel-
opment appears to be the strongest governance contribution. Considering the population 
density and the role of rural livelihood insecurity in the genocide, this activity by Alpha 
can also be considered conflict-relevant in that it helps to provide livelihood opportuni-
ties for subsistence farmers. The sometimes elaborate socio-economic activities by Alpha 
only relate to one general policy by Alpha’s Group: its “moral obligation” towards its host 
community and state (company website). Alpha’s activities regarding the socio-economic 
area are therefore not based on specific policies but instead relate to its corporate identity 
and self-perception in general.  
In the area of ‘socio-cultural’ governance contributions, Alpha has no policies or ac-
tivities in place.  
Summary 
Alpha’s doctrine of remaining a-political results in its security governance inactivity. 
Throughout the various conflict escalations in Rwanda, the company has tried (and not 
always succeeded) to protect its employees but has remained passive about broader secu-
rity governance provision. Nevertheless, Alpha pursues corporate policies and activities 
that are of the highest international standards, unparalleled in Rwanda and clearly beyond 
legal obligations. Some policies and activities relate to policy fields that are considered 
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conflict-relevant in the Rwandan context, including policy and behavior regarding ‘politi-
cal order’, such as human rights, laws, and transparency/corruption. Another governance 
contribution relevant to peace and security is Alpha’s development of and involvement in 
its local supply chain, securing a regular income and basic health care for subsistence 
farmers. It therefore targets a socio-economic divide which was previously exploited to 
mobilize the genocide. 
3.2 Kuehne+Nagel in Northern Ireland 
The conflict zone: Northern Ireland 
The conflict in Northern Ireland – often played down as the ‘Troubles’ – is about the ri-
valry of two groups. On the one side there is the Catholic-republican-nationalist commu-
nity originating from the Irish; on the other side there is the Protestant-unionist-loyalist 
community originating from Scottish and British settlers. The causes of the conflict are 
manifold, though unequal access to and distribution of political and economic goods 
appears to be one of the main reasons. The Protestant community misused its structural 
majority to marginalize the Catholic community in political, social and economical issues 
(cf. Kandel 2005: 101-112).  
Between 1969 and 2007, the conflict caused more than 3,300 fatalities and approxi-
mately 50,000 people were seriously injured.20 In addition, many uncounted acts of crime 
and violence directly resulted from the conflict. After many failed peace initiatives, the 
Belfast Agreement of 1998 represented the breakthrough for the peace process. In May 
2007, devolution, the right of Northern Ireland to govern itself in many political issue 
areas, was restored to the Northern Ireland Assembly. After the following election, the 
formerly hostile political parties, the unionist Democratic Ulster Party and the republican 
Sinn Féin, agreed on forming a government within a system of consociational democracy. 
Despite all the inherited burdens of the conflict, it seems that the two most opposed par-
ties have settled terms, technically resolving the politically motivated violence in Northern 
Ireland. In spite of all positive developments and trends, many problems still compromise 
the peace process in Northern Ireland. Although people in Northern Ireland live in the 
most peaceful period of time since the beginning of the violent conflict, paramilitary 
groups are still active and held responsible for acts of violence and organized crime, 
though on a much lower level than before the peace agreement.21 Another problem is the 
structural cleavage that divides Northern Irish society into two embittered parties. The 
segregation between the two communities still exists (cf. Shirlow/Murtagh 2006) and sec-
 
 
20 www.psni.police.uk/index/statistics_branch/pg_security_stats.htm (15.02.2008). 
21 For the ongoing activities of the paramilitary organisations see the reports of the Independent Monitoring 
Commission available on their website www.independentmonitoringcommission.org.  
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tarianism and discrimination are prominent problems in Northern Ireland (Moltmann 
2002: 30-45). In summary, the violent conflict has politically been brought to an end, but 
societal patterns still reflect the conflict divides.  
Background on the industry and company 
The structure of the Northern Irish economy has changed dramatically during the past 50 
years. Traditional industries have declined, especially shipbuilding and textile, while new 
industries in the service sector, such as software engineering, finance, etc., have emerged. 
Not least because of the ceasefire between the IRA and the loyalist paramilitary groups in 
1994 and the Belfast Agreement in 1998, the Northern Irish economy has experienced a 
strong economic upturn since the middle of the 1990s. The whole economy, primarily 
driven by the emerging service sector, enjoyed an economic boom, the ‘peace-dividend’. 
Kuehne+Nagel Northern Ireland (K+N (NI)) is operating in the service sector. 
Kuehne+Nagel (K+N) is a logistics company offering services in the areas of sea freight, 
air cargo, street and railroad logistics. The company is a global player employing more 
than 48,000 people at approximately 830 locations in more than 100 countries. The 
headquarters of K+N is located in Schindellegi/Switzerland. K+N (NI) is a fully-
owned subsidiary of K+N International AG and has operated in Northern Ireland since 
July 2001. In 2006, the company employed 97 people at its location in Belfast.22 Its busi-
ness activities include a broad spectrum of business-to-business services, such as sea 
freight, airfreight, and overland, as well as warehouse and distribution logistics. 
K+N (NI) actively engages in CSR activities, such as charitable events, which do not 
qualify as governance contributions to peace and security. In general, the CSR activities of 
K+N (NI) are similar to those in other countries where K+N operates. These CSR issues 
do not relate either directly or indirectly to the post-conflict situation in Northern Ire-
land. Therefore, they are not of interest to this case study, which focuses on CSR activities 
that can be qualified as governance contributions to peace and security. 
Main governance contributions 
Security governance 
The empirical investigation reveals that K+N (NI) makes no contributions to security 
governance as conceptualized in chapter 2. None of their activities either relate directly to 
the post-conflict situation nor do they directly aim to reduce the level of political violence 
in Northern Ireland. 
 
 
22 Data based on the Monitoring Report No. 17 published by the Equality Commission for Northern Ire-
land, www.equalityni.org/archive/pdf/MonitoringReportNo17.pdf (16.09.2008). 
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Governance contributions to other policy fields relevant to peace and security 
K+N (NI) provides governance contributions to peace and security in the dimensions of 
‘political order’ and ‘socio-economic issues’. 
One important source for the policies of the company is the ‘employee handbook’, 
where a lot of regulations about the relationship between the employer and the employee 
are outlined, such as employment, contracts, industrial law, and general, everyday dignity 
in business interactions. Two issues mentioned in the handbook are of immediate rele-
vance to the conflict: labor regulations regarding anti-discrimination and equal opportu-
nity in the workplace. While the first issue can be qualified as engagement in the field of 
‘political order’, the aspect of equal opportunity at the workplace is regarded as engage-
ment in the socio-economic field. Additionally, K+N (NI) provides training for its em-
ployees on these issues. All employees of K+N (NI) have a written, up-to-date copy of this 
document. The handbook includes specific forms and disciplinary procedures in case of 
policy violation. These disciplinary procedures vary from an oral warning to the dismissal 
of the respective employee.  
The company is committed to the employment right of a working environment free of 
harassment and discrimination. K+N (NI) will undertake every reasonable effort to en-
sure that no employee is subjected to any kind of harassment in the workplace. The hand-
book describes specific mechanisms that are triggered when discrimination or harassment 
take place. These procedures include a complaint mechanism which guarantees complete 
anonymity for affected employees and involves an investigation by the company, discipli-
nary measures and corrective action programs.  
Northern Ireland has one of the most elaborate employment legislations regarding 
discrimination in the workplace in Europe. The ‘Fair Employment’ legislation regulates 
that employers have to create and maintain a neutral workplace where everyday discrimi-
nation is banned. Most companies in Northern Ireland abide by the legislation because 
legal compliance is strictly monitored and sanctioned. Due to this strong regulatory envi-
ronment, it is unsurprising that companies doing business in Northern Ireland are en-
gaged in employment rights and anti-discrimination. Given the strong public regulation 
and the fact that there is not much room left for individual engagement, it seems surpris-
ing that some companies walk an extra mile and implement activities which are beyond 
what is required by the law.  
K+N (NI) complies with the law, but the majority of their initiatives to create a neutral 
workplace go beyond legislation. For example, the company aims to create a neutral 
workplace by not allowing its staff to display any kind of tattoo, irrespective of whether 
they are political or not. Employees have to wear appropriate clothing to cover their tat-
toos. The reason for this prohibition is that some people in Northern Ireland wear tattoos 
that incite hatred of the other community. It is a heritage of the conflict and the company 
wants to ban these forms of provocations from the workplace. Another example is the 
company’s dress-down policy on Fridays: employees of K+N (NI) are not allowed to wear 
football shirts, irrespective of the club they represent. People wearing these shirts will be 
sent home immediately. The reason for this prohibition is similar to the tattoo issue. Cer-
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tain football clubs are associated with each of the communities. Every symbol that can be 
associated with a community is banned because it is the company’s aim to create a work-
place that is as neutral as possible: 
“The whole thing, whether it is tattoos, whether it is football shirts, any form of association 
with some form of club – we actually effectively ban it. We don’t have to ban but we choose 
to. That is directly linked to the conflict situation or the post-conflict situation” (Interview 
with company representative). 
The following example illustrates the activities of K+N (NI) going clearly beyond the legal 
requirements. Two members of K+N’s (NI) warehouse staff – each belonging to a differ-
ent community – were involved in a pub brawl. The dispute would not need to be of con-
cern to the company as the fight took place outside of the workplace. However, as both 
were employees of K+N (NI) the company became active. K+N (NI) decided to terminate 
the employment of the person who had started the fight. That person is now attempting 
to take the company to court for unfair dismissal. At first glace this incident is only of 
anecdotal value. However, the company claims that it would act in the same way in simi-
lar cases. This reaction is representative of the company’s policy to ban harassment and 
discrimination related to the conflict. 
In addition to this, K+N (NI) commits itself to the principle of equal opportunities in 
employment, according to the policy stated in the employee handbook. The company 
opposes any form of discrimination of employees or job applicants on the basis of their 
sex, religion, color, background, nationality or ethnic origins. K+N (NI) wants to encour-
age diversity in its workforce. In everyday practice, this means that the advertisement of 
jobs and the selection process of applicants have to be in line with strict criteria to ensure 
that no candidate will be rejected for reasons other than professional qualifications or 
skills. Managers and non-managers share responsibility for both the discrimination and 
the equality issues. All employees, in the realm of their respective responsibilities, have to 
ensure that equality is guaranteed. The workforce in Northern Ireland is unequally dis-
tributed. The disadvantage that the catholic community suffers in the labor market has 
lessened in the past 20 years, but there is still an imbalance. K+N (NI) actively seeks the 
highest possible equality in its workforce composition.23 If the company wants to fill a 
vacancy, it will advertise the job internally and externally and interview people. The staff-
ing policy of K+N (NI) is therefore in accordance with the law but also to some extent 
goes beyond what the law demands and so fosters a more equal access to employment 
opportunities between the members of the two communities. 
Why are these contributions relevant for the post-conflict situation in Northern Ireland? 
The analysis revealed that the activities of K+N (NI) are linked to the post-conflict situation 
 
 
23 However, beyond the staffing policy of the corporation there are also structural reasons for the unequal 
distribution of the workforce in Northern Ireland which cannot be influenced by companies, i.e. the com-
position of communities in the area where the company is located, etc. (cf. Osborne/Shuttleworth 2004a). 
18 Moira Feil/Susanne Fischer/Andreas Haidvogl/Melanie Zimmer 
 
 
because they relate either to issues or to enduring drivers of the conflict. Discrimination, 
particularly in the workplace, seems to be a critical topic. Even though most employers, 
Protestant as well as Catholic, perceive their workplace as a neutral space, there is still a lot 
of people who avoid workplaces situated in areas dominated by the opposite community. 
Data from the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey show that approximately 30% of 
people with a Catholic background would avoid applying for a job in a mainly Protestant 
area – and vice versa.24 The inequalities in distribution and access to economic goods 
between the two parties to the conflict are considered as central reasons for the emergence 
of the conflict in Northern Ireland (cf. McGarry/O'Leary 1995: 265-310). The structural 
inequality of access to the labor market is especially regarded as an important factor in the 
conflict (Heaton/Teague 1997; Osborne/Shuttleworth 2004b: 1). The unequal distribution 
of economic goods became apparent through the underrepresentation of employees with a 
Catholic background in the workforce and in their proportionately higher unemployment 
rate. Although inequality in the composition of the workforce declined steadily during the 
past 15 years, a certain level of inequality persists.25 
Summary 
Because of the strong employment legislation in Northern Ireland there is not much room 
for companies to further develop and implement activities that are relevant to the post-
conflict situation and related to the peace process in Northern Ireland. K+N (NI), how-
ever, walks the extra mile by making contributions to other fields relevant to peace and 
security, i.e. in the dimensions of ‘political order’ (employment rights: harassment and 
discrimination) and ‘socio-economic issues’ (fair distribution of economic goods: equal 
employment opportunity). This behavior is partly regulated by host state law and partly 
voluntarily. Consequently, it seems surprising at first glance that K+N (NI) takes these 
steps that are not demanded by Northern Ireland law.  
In this case, the policies and the behavior of the company are linked quite closely. All 
the policies K+N (NI) committed to are also implemented in practice. In reverse, the 
company’s activities relate to and are in full accordance with the policies to which the 
company committed. The described activities are relevant for the peace process in North-
ern Ireland because they are linked to issues of the conflict. While the activities of K+N 
(NI) follow precise and binding policies, the scope of these engagements is quite limited. 
As mentioned above, the company is engaged in a very broad CSR agenda that radiates 
into the local community. However, applying the perspective described in chapter 2, it 
 
 
24 www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2006 (15.05.2008). 
25 For the distribution of jobs among the two communities in Northern Ireland see the monitoring reports 
of the Northern Irish Workforce annually published by the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, 
www.equalityni.org/sections/default.asp?cms=Publications_Fair%20employment%20and%20treatment_
monitoring%20reports&cmsid=7_35_256&id=256&secid=8 (14.05.2008). 
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becomes obvious that the corporation’s governance contributions to peace and security 
are limited to the workplace. 
3.3 Studiosus in Israel/Palestinian Territories  
The conflict zone: Israel-Palestinian Territories 
Initially, the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians was embedded in the conflict 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors that resulted in several wars. In 1947 the implementa-
tion of UN-Resolution 181, which foresaw an Israeli as well as a Palestinian state on the 
territory then under British mandate, failed. In response, relations between Israelis and 
Palestinians became increasingly violent. The first (1987-1993) and the second (2000-2005) 
intifada were only two periods of high level, open violence. The conflict is about territory26. 
The second intifada claimed about 6,300 lives on both sides between 2000-2008.27  
In 1993, negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians enabled the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles (DoP). However, the parties did not fulfill their obligations, 
which ultimately led to the collapse of the peace process in 2000. Since then, the humani-
tarian situation in the Palestinian Territories has seriously deteriorated, partly because of 
Israeli restrictions on movement and access. As a consequence, the Palestinian economy 
has faced a substantial breakdown: the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita de-
creased from $1.612 in 1999, to $1.129 in 2006 (The World Bank 2007: 2). 28.4% of the 
population on the West Bank face unemployment and 58% of Palestinians live below the 
poverty line (United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2007: 1f). Additionally, the 
development of effective political institutions, the establishment of the rule of law, and the 
fight against corruption has almost ground to a halt in the Palestinian Territories. Cur-
rently, despite the peace initiative launched by the US president in 2007, there is no peace 
agreement in sight. The conference of Annapolis in November 2007 marked the starting 
point for a new round of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians for peace and 
the creation of a Palestinian state. The core issues that have to be negotiated during this 
process are security, borders, refugees, settlements, Jerusalem and access to water. 
 
 
26 Uppsala University, Conflict Database, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, type of incompatibility: territory; com-
ment on type of incompatibility: the incompatibility was over the territory of Palestine, www. 
pcr.uu.se/database/conflictInformation.php?years=2007&bcID=227&variables%5B%5D=1&button=+Search 
(10.03.2008), Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), Conflict Barometer 2007. 16th 
Annual Conflict Analysis, www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2007.pdf (21.06.2008). 
27 For a detailed chart regarding the fatalities see website of B’Tselem: fatalities/intifada fatalities, www. 
btselem.org/english/statistics/Casualties.asp (10.03.2008). 
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Background on industry and company 
Despite several security and safety crises, tourism is one of the growing sectors (6% in 
2007) in the world economy, according to the UN World Tourism Organization Barome-
ter 2007 (UNWTO 2007: 1). Although tourism in Israel suffered serious regression during 
and after the Lebanon war in 2006, this sector is also regarded as an important economic 
factor for Israel and the Palestinians. In 2007, 2.2 million tourists visited Israel with pre-
dictions of five million visitors in 2012 (Bundesagentur für Außenwirtschaft (bfai) 2007: 
9). Against the background of the Annapolis process, the tourism potential was also dis-
cussed during the Palestine Investment Conference (“Investing in Palestine’s Treasures”) 
in Bethlehem in early 2008.28 However, although many tourist sites are located in the Pal-
estinian Territories, the Palestinian tourism sector will probably not be able to benefit 
from the trend in the Israeli tourism sector. Due to serious security conditions, restric-
tions on movement and travel warnings from institutions such as foreign ministries, most 
tour operators cancelled their tours to historical sites, such as Bethlehem and Jericho, in 
the Palestinian Territories. Few tour operators are aware of the unbalanced benefits be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians resulting from these restrictions. One of these is the Ger-
man tour operator Studiosus which makes the company an instructive case concerning 
the role of business in zones of violent conflict.  
In 2007 the German tourism sector reached a turnover of 20.3 billion Euro, with the big-
gest tourism companies being TUI Germany, Thomas Cook and the Rewe Group (DRV 
2007: 14), and smaller companies being, for example, Öger Tours GmbH or Studiosus 
München GmbH. Studiosus was founded in 1954 and is a family owned enterprise with 
headquarters located in Munich, Germany. Studiosus employs 880 people, 650 of which 
are tour guides. Approximately 230 employees plan and organize the 800 different tours 
in 100 countries for more than 6000 vacations (Studiosus 2007a: 2). Compared to the year 
2006, the turnover in 2007 increased by 8% to 220 million Euro (Studiosus 2007c: 81). In 
its vision, Studiosus states that it wants to contribute to a better understanding of differ-
ent countries, people and cultures (Studiosus 2007b: paragraph 1). Therefore a special 
range of products, including the ‘Modern Study Tour’, was developed by Studiosus. The 
company is known for its transparent security and safety management as well as for its 
intensive and regular training of tour guides. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Studiosus 
has become more and more active in Corporate Social Responsibility. Consequently, this 
case study covers the period from 1990 until 2007. During this term, Studiosus organised 
three different types of tour in Israel. The company relies on tour guides who usually live 
in Israel. Studiosus cooperates with hotels in Tel Aviv, Tiberias, En Gev, En Bokek and 
Jerusalem. Due to travel warnings by the German foreign ministry, there are no guided 
 
 
28 Palestine Investment Conference, Bethlehem 2008, www.pic-palestine.ps/download/brochure.pdf 
(09.05.2008). 
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tours to the West Bank or Gaza, which means that visits to Bethlehem or Jericho are tem-
porarily cancelled until travel warnings are lifted.  
Main governance contributions 
Security governance  
Although Studiosus is widely considered the industry leader of security and safety man-
agement strategies, the company does not contribute to security governance through its 
policies and behavior.29 In regions with high crime rates the company works with the local 
tourism agencies or authorities, as they organize official security guards from the police. 
Studiosus does not directly collaborate with private security companies or private military 
companies. In order to gain a more consistent security management system a department 
that deals with security and safety affairs was established within the company in 2004. 
Based on Studiosus’ policy of prevention, the members of this department systematically 
monitor the relevant regions.30 In case of alerts, such as kidnappings, terror attacks or 
earthquakes, measures are implemented to assure the security of customers. These can be 
changes in the guided routes or cancellation of the entire tour. The company’s approach 
makes apparent that security is provided exclusively for the customers of Studiosus dur-
ing their sightseeing trips or in hotels but not for the general public. 
Governance contributions to other policy fields relevant to peace and security 
The company’s mission statement indicates that management and employees are in-
formed about the positive and negative consequences that tourism can have on the people 
and societies in the host states: 
“We are well aware that, regarding aspects such as social responsibility and environmental 
compatibility, all forms of tourism can cause problems. Tourists consume energy for trans-
port and influence the structure of local societies. Furthermore, tourism requires specific in-
frastructure to be built and maintained. However, the degree and extent of such burdens 
depends heavily on how tours are organized. We aim to offer tours that are socially and en-
vironmentally responsible, and we believe that modern study tours provide the best prereq-
uisites to achieve this aim” (Studiosus 2007b: paragraph 6.5, translation SF).  
As the company only recently became a member of the Global Compact (September 
2007), the commitments that result from membership of the Tour Operators’ Initiative 
(TOI)31 and the commitments on environmental issues can be regarded as the most im-
portant sources for the company’s policies. Moreover, the mission statement reflects the 
 
 
29 Source for the entire paragraph on security and safety management: Studiosus Headquarters 2007: Inter-
view (safety and yield management, 19.10.2007), Munich. 
30 To assure systematic monitoring Studiosus has developed an analytical scheme that classifies different 
world regions according to their level of security (crisis).  
31 For further information on the operations of the TOI see: www.toinitiative.org (24.06.08). 
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company’s core commitments. With these commitments, Studiosus appears to be an ac-
tive company contributing to peace and security through the ‘political order’ and ‘socio-
economic’ policy fields.32 
As an example of governance contributions to ‘political order’, Studiosus adopted an 
anti-corruption policy in July 2006. The chapter of the mission statement that deals with 
the company’s policy regarding local partners states “We don’t take an active part in 
measures that can be defined as corruption”33. Furthermore, it announces that ‘passive 
corruption’ will be penalized. This aspect becomes very important for operations in the 
Palestinian Territories where corruption is widespread and hampers economic prosperity 
as well as transparency and fairness of administrative processes. Both of these factors, 
economic prosperity and fair and transparent processes, are important in Palestinian 
efforts to build up a stable and functioning economic and governmental system. As the 
latter can be considered a prerequisite for the implementation of peace negotiation out-
comes, Studiosus’s engagement becomes relevant to peace and security. In order to im-
plement these company commitments, Studiosus ensures that their tour guides receive 
intensive training and education. According to the company’s mission statement, the tour 
guides play an important role in monitoring adherence to company commitments by the 
local partners. Tour guides are instructed to report corruption or bad environmental 
management (Studiosus 2007a: 4), for example, to company headquarters. This mecha-
nism seems to be an innovative strategy to ensure the adherence by local partners to the 
commitments. 
The company pursues a twofold approach regarding its governance contributions in 
the ‘socio-economic’ dimension.34 On the one hand – as laid down in the TOI principles 
and the company’s mission statement (Studiosus 2007b: paragraph 2.3) – Studiosus 
strongly expresses its commitment to sustainable tourism.35 This means that local com-
munities have to benefit in a fair way from the company’s operations in the region. This 
becomes a very important factor for tourism in the Holy Land, as tour operators usually 
only collaborate with partners from the Israeli side36 which creates imbalanced prospects 
 
 
32 Studiosus also explicitly opposes child prostitution in its mission statement since summer 2006 and is a 
member of ECPAT/The Code – an initiative that especially fights the sexual abuse of children. As child 
prostitution is not intertwined with factors that enhance the persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
these contributions to governance – which can be categorized as ‘contributions in the field political or-
der/human rights’ – are not relevant for peace and security in this region and therefore not included in 
this study. 
33 Studiosus 2007d: Studiosus’s mission statement, Munich: www.studiosus.com/unternehmen/leitbild_ 
fakten/unternehmensleitbild/index.php (19.09.2007). 
34 Source concerning Studiosus’s social responsibility and TOI: Studiosus Headquarters 2007: Interview 
(public relations, 11.12.2007), Munich. 
35 The terms ‚sustainable tourism’ and ‚fair tourism’ are used interchangeably. 
36 Raheb, M.: Interview (Dar Annadwa, 01.12.2007), Bethlehem/Palestinian Territories. 
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for the local tourism facilities to earn money and further widens the economical gap be-
tween the parties to the conflict, to the disadvantage of the Palestinian people. Against 
this background and to contribute to local economic prospects, the Studiosus foundation 
supports social and environmental projects that are related to tourism. One project part-
ner is the Dar Annadwa Center located in Bethlehem.37 The center facilitates cross-cultural 
encounters and works to empower the local community. It developed the concept of ‘Au-
thentic Tourism’ and was awarded the TO DO! Prize for Socially Responsible Tourism in 
1996.38  
Studiosus has successfully introduced an environmental management system certified 
by European and international standardization institutions.39 Although these certifica-
tions only apply to the operational headquarters, Studiosus has committed to fostering 
compliance with environmental standards beyond its headquarters. For example, they 
mainly collaborate with local partners who fulfill the environmental criteria defined by 
these management systems. To ensure dissemination of these commitments, Studiosus 
carries out seminars at select tourist destinations in order to foster environmental aware-
ness and demonstrate new ways of managing environmental challenges that arise from 
tourism. These seminars usually take place in hotels that have already implemented tools 
for environmental management. Before booking a hotel, Studiosus makes sure that their 
guidelines are implemented in detail, including briefings at the local hotels. Due to the 
fact that water resources are a very important aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
also a core issue of the peace negotiations, the company’s environmental engagement also 
shows an expedient way to deal with these issues.  
Summary 
This study of Studiosus reveals no security governance contributions, although Studiosus 
is well known in the tourism sector for its strict security and safety management. How-
ever, analysis of the company’s policies and behavior shows that Studiosus contributes to 
peace and security in two policy fields: ‘socio-economic’ (fair tourism and environmental 
management) and ‘political order’ (anti-corruption policy). The study also demonstrates 
that there are strong connections between the company’s statements and its observable 
behavior. This qualifies Studiosus’ engagement as systematic and sustainable. The com-
 
 
37 Dar Annadwa: www.annadwa.org/en (12.05.2008).  
38 TO DO! International Contest Socially Responsible Tourism: www.todo-contest.org/preistraeger.html 
(13.05.2008). 
39 The environmental management system of Studiosus is certified by DIN EN ISO 14001. For further in-
formation on standardization of (environmental) management processes see: German Institute for Stan-
dardization (DIN), www.din.de/cmd?level=tpl-home&contextid=din (24.06.08); International Standardi-
zation Organisation (ISO): www.iso.org/iso/home.htm (24.06.2008). The environmental management 
system of Studiosus additionally holds an Eco-Management and Audit Scheme II (EMAS II) certification. 
For further information concerning EMAS see: www.emas.de/ (24.06.2008). 
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pany’s measures to ensure implementation of its policies also have to be highlighted. 
These measures include regular seminars and advisory workshops, as well as monitoring 
by the tour guides. It is also important to mention that Studiosus focuses on issues and 
projects that have a strong relation to tourism, as the company feels responsible for the 
negative effects of its operations in the host states and it sees its problem-solving capacity 
as most effective in challenges arising from tourism. However, it is highly important not 
to exclude the conflict context from the reflections on the company’s engagement: solving 
the core political conflict issues remains the responsibility of politicians in the region. 
3.4 Shell in Nigeria 
The conflict zone: Nigeria 
Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain in 1960. The military determined Nige-
rian politics for most of the next 40 years, interrupted only by short periods of civilian 
government. Despite the transition to democracy after the sudden death of military dicta-
tor General Sani Abacha in 1998, the country has suffered from several violent conflicts.40 
Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producing country; oil accounts for over 95% of export earn-
ings. The country’s vast oil resources are mainly located in the Niger Delta in south-
eastern Nigeria. Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria and especially the Niger Delta suffer from 
severe poverty as well as from the negative effects of oil production (see for example 
UNDP Nigeria 2006).41 As for many other developing countries, its natural resources are 
more of a curse than a blessing. 
The distribution of oil revenues has been an issue of contention since Nigerian inde-
pendence. The Niger Delta has been a major site of violence, social unrest and criminality; 
the conflicts are between varying constellations of political and ethnic groupings, militias, 
and the government. Violence is also targeted at oil companies operating in the Niger 
Delta. It is hard to disentangle the different issues underlying the eruption of violence in 
the Niger Delta and beyond, though they include ethnic and religious frictions, competi-
tion over political power and conflicts over the ownership and distribution of resources, 
especially revenues from oil production. The communities in the Niger Delta suffer from 
marginalization and socio-economic deprivation, which is exacerbated by environmental 
degradation caused by oil production. Conflicts are further fuelled by endemic corrup-
 
 
40 Arbeitsgruppe Kriegsursachenforschung www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/index.htm 
and Uppsala Conflict Database www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/index.htm (12.03.2008). 
41 The Niger Delta Development Report even discovered that those local communities without oil facilities 
in the Nigeria Delta are socio-economically better off than those with oil production facilities (UNDP Ni-
geria 2006: 2). 
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tion42, security forces violating human rights, the proliferation of small arms, operations 
by well-equipped private militias and a high level of criminality (for an analysis of the 
situation in the Niger Delta see International Crisis Group 2006a and 2006b).  
Democracy still remains fragile as the violence surrounding the 2003 and 2007 elec-
tions has highlighted.43 Nigeria’s World Bank Governance indicators have hardly im-
proved and political stability has even decreased since 1999.44 
Background on the industry and company 
Shell was selected as a case study because it is the single most important oil production 
company operating in Nigeria. At the same time, it is often recognized as an industry 
leader in CSR, raising expectations for contributions to governance. The Anglo-Dutch 
Shell Group operates in more than 130 countries worldwide and employs approximately 
108,000 people (Shell 2007: 1). In Nigeria, Shell is active through several companies, the 
most important of which is the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). In 1938 
the company (then Shell D’Arcy) was granted an oil exploration license by the British 
colonial government. Today, other companies active in oil production in Nigeria include 
Chevron and ExxonMobil (both USA), Total (France), ENI/Agip (Italy), Statoil (Norway) 
and Sinopec (China). In general, the oil industry is characterized by high asset specificity 
and considerable sunk costs; both facts provide strong incentives for companies to stay in 
the Delta region despite the continuing unrest and violence. Shell’s facilities and pipelines 
(of more than 6,000 km) and those of other oil companies are vulnerable to the conflict as 
violence has continually caused disruption of oil production and closure of production 
facilities. For example, it is estimated that 20% of possible total oil production was left in 
the ground due to militant activity in the month preceding the 2007 election.45 In the 
1990s, Shell became a target of community protests and a global civil society campaign 
because of its irresponsible social and environmental behavior as well as its cooperation 
with public security forces, culminating after the execution of the Ogoni Nine46. Today, 
 
 
42 Nigeria ranks 147 out of 179 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 (10.03.2008). 
43 The Freedom House Index considers Nigeria as “partly free” www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page 
=22&country=7244&year=2007 (13.05.2008). 
44 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp (13.05.2008). 
45 US Energy Information Administration 2007: Country Analysis Briefs: Nigeria www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ 
cabs/Nigeria/Background.html (15.06.2008). 
46 The Ogoni people are one of the smaller ethnic groups living in the Niger Delta. They started organizing 
and protesting against oil exploration on their land (mainly done by Shell) in the early 1990s. The primary 
target of their protests was the Nigerian government, though they accused Shell of cooperating with the 
government in depriving the Ogoni of their land and a fair share of revenues from the oil production. 
Nine leading figures of the Ogoni protest were sentenced to death after a mock trial in 1994 and executed 
in 1995 (International Crisis Group 2006b: 4f). The Ogoni protest gained international attention and 
brought the issues of oil companies’ conduct in developing countries and conflict zones onto the interna-
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Shell is recognized widely as a company that has changed its approach (see for example 
Rieth/Zimmer 2004; Ite 2007). Due to the limited space in this paper, the case study will 
focus on selected examples of Shell’s current policies and activities (these were mainly 
developed after 1995, the year of the execution of the Ogoni Nine), without denying or 
downplaying Shell’s past wrongdoings. 
Main governance contributions 
Security governance 
Shell has severe security problems affecting its operations in the Niger Delta, including 
attacks on facilities and pipelines as well as kidnapping of personnel (Shell Nigeria 2007: 
7f). Due to the escalation of violence, Shell has been repeatedly forced to halt production 
and withdraw staff from certain areas in the Delta.  
Heavily criticized for its calling upon and cooperating with Nigerian security forces that 
were committing human rights violations in the Delta47, Shell has joined the US and UK 
governments as well as NGOs and other companies from the extractive industries to de-
velop the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights in 2000. The Voluntary Prin-
ciples (VP) are standards for companies’ dealings with public and private security forces. In 
line with the VP, Shell acknowledges that “[c]ompanies and civil society can play a role in 
assisting host governments with security sector reform.”48 The goal of the standard is “to 
guide companies in maintaining the safety and security of their operations, in an operat-
ing framework that ensures respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”.49 Shell 
has a Group Security Standard that guides its security-related activities worldwide, which 
is currently being revised to explore how the VP can be integrated.50 Shell has also com-
mitted to implementing the Voluntary Principles in Nigeria (Mylonas 2008: 15). The im-
plementation is currently being discussed with Nigerian authorities. Shell also states that 
security and human rights training will be developed for officials from Nigerian security 
officials (Mylonas 2008: 15).51 It is obvious that Shell is trying to establish safety and secu-
rity for its own operations and personnel in the first instance, thus providing a private 
 
 
tional agenda. Shell seized its operations in the Ogoni area in 1993. In June 2008 the Nigerian government 
decided to replace Shell since the company has not resumed oil production in the region. 
47 See for example Human Rights Watch (1999). 
48 Shell introduces the Voluntary Principles on its website: www.shell.com/home/content/envirosoc-en/ 
society/security/security_human_rights/voluntary_principles_25042007.html (12.03.2008). 
49 www.voluntaryprinciples.org/principles/index.php (12.03.2008). 
50 The security standard can be found at www.shell.com/home/content/envirosoc-en/making_it_ 
hapen/our_commitments_and_standards/health_safety_and_environment/security_standard/security_ 
standard_24042007.html (12.03.2008). 
51 Shell Website www.shell.com/home/content/envirosoc-en/society/security/security_human_rights/volun 
tary_principles_25042007.html (12.03.2008). 
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good. At the same time, Shell’s approach to security has changed in the last decade, as the 
company is now trying to minimize negative externalities on communities. While Shell’s 
commitment to implement the Voluntary Principles is a remarkable one that goes beyond 
law in the host state, the principles are not yet systematically implemented. It is rather that 
implementation is currently discussed and explored on the global level and in several coun-
tries. Shell’s commitment can be regarded as a contribution to governance in the Nigerian 
context because human rights violations by security forces are a recurring issue. It is impor-
tant to note that the implementation of the Voluntary Principles for companies’ dealing 
with public security forces is not dependent just on companies’ willingness but also requires 
the consent of and cooperation with governmental actors and security forces, which might 
not always be easy to achieve.52 
Governance contributions to other policy fields relevant to peace and security 
Shell/SPDC can be considered to contribute to governance in several conflict-relevant 
policy fields. Shell’s main policy documents are the General Business Principles and the 
Code of Conduct.53 The commitments of the General Business Principles are applicable 
worldwide for all Shell operations, including Nigeria.54 
Shell’s most important contributions in the ‘political order’ dimension can be found in 
its efforts to fight corruption and promote transparency. In this realm, Shell has commit-
ted itself to initiatives such as the Transparency International Business Principles and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).55 Corruption is a serious problem in 
Nigeria and is closely related to the issue of transparency and distribution of oil revenues. 
The most important governance contribution reaching beyond the companies’ bound-
aries is its support for the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI). 
Nigeria was the first country that officially committed itself to implementing EITI in 
2003. A National Stakeholder Working Group was founded to steer the initiative and 
oversee implementation.56 SPDC’s Country Chair is a member of the stakeholder working 
 
 
52 In general, there is a difference between companies’ dealings with public security forces and dealings with 
private security forces. When dealing with private security companies, oil companies as a buyer of security 
services are more clearly in a position to determine the terms of reference and to set standards. 
53 The General Business Principles were reviewed after the escalation of violence in Nigeria in the mid 1990s 
and the ensuing civil society campaign against Shell. A further revision took place in 2005 but was not as 
fundamental as in 1997. The Business Principles are further detailed in Shell’s new Code of Conduct 
launched in 2006. Available at www.shell.com/sgbp/ (10.03.2008). 
54 Shell General Business Principles, Principle 8, www.shell.com/sgbp/ (10.03.2008). 
55 EITI was initiated by Tony Blair at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 
2002. Before this, an NGO campaign was asking companies to “Publish What You Pay” to their host gov-
ernments. EITI asks governments to publish what they receive and companies to publish what they pay. 
Shell is one of the official supporters of the initiative. www.eitransparency.org (10.03.2008). 
56 The National Stakeholder Working Group is the governing body of NEITI. It consists of government, 
civil society and company representatives.  
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group. In 2007, the NEITI Act was passed and signed by then President Obasanjo.57 While 
publishing data is now obligatory for companies in Nigeria, Shell’s support from the very 
beginning for EITI on the global level and NEITI in Nigeria, as well as its representation 
in the National Stakeholder Working Group is a voluntary contribution to governance. It 
might be argued that this is an easy and not very costly governance contribution for Shell 
and critical civil society organizations questioned in interviews whether NEITI really 
helps to improve the situation of the people in the Niger Delta. However, the effect of 
EITI on the political debate and processes should not be underestimated and even critical 
voices see the initiative as a step forward to create transparency about oil revenues.58 
In ‘socio-economic’ dimension, Shell commits to sustainable development, i.e. integrat-
ing economic, environmental and social considerations into business decision making. The 
company considers poverty to be one of the main factors that induces instability in the Ni-
ger Delta: 
“In our view, there are three major factors at the root of instability in the Niger Delta – un-
fulfilled aspirations for political recognition and influence, poverty and historical neglect, 
and criminality.”59 
Shell invests large sums into its community development programs: US$ 53.3million in 
2006 (Shell Nigeria 2007). These programs are located in the oil producing regions in the 
Niger Delta where Shell is operating. It is interesting to note that some community pro-
grams - albeit with a different focus and different design - started back in the 1960s. Pro-
tests and demands voiced by different groups in the oil producing communities make it 
an obvious fact that these programs were not and are not accepted by communities as a 
sufficient compensation for the oil taken from their land and for damages caused by oil 
production (Ite 2007: 3-4). The question is, who exactly is responsible for providing these 
goods and services to communities and how is responsibility divided between companies 
and governmental actors? Shell’s community development program today covers four 
areas: health care, education, youth development, as well as economic empowerment and 
business development.60 In contrast to the past, Shell now more often designs and imple-
ments its program in partnership with other organizations such as UNDP, USAID or 
Africare. Shell also seeks to negotiate “global memoranda of understanding” with com-
munities to establish long term, transparent relationships when implementing programs 
(Shell Nigeria 2007: Sustainable Community Development). These changes are mainly 
due to community protest and partly violent unrest that forced Shell to react to secure its 
social license to operate in the communities. Environmental issues are also important to 
 
 
57 “With this, Nigeria became the first EITI-implementing country with a statutory backing for implement-
ing EITI”; www.eitransparency.org (12.03.2008). 
58 www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/background.shtml (12.03.2008). 
59 www.shell.com/home/content/nigeria/about_shell/issues/security/security.html (12.03.2008). 
60 www.shell.com/home/content2/nigeria/society_environment/dir_community_development.html 
(12.03.2008). 
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consider in the context of the Niger Delta. It is obvious that oil production has caused 
severe environmental problems in the Delta region, including oil spills (partly due to 
sabotage and partly due to outdated facilities) and the practice of gas flaring. These envi-
ronmental problems have consequently caused severe hardship for communities that 
depend on the environment for making their living (e.g. subsistence farming and fishing). 
Shell has committed to minimizing the environmental impact of its operations, but the 
company takes the national legislation as its point of reference (Shell Nigeria 2007: Envi-
ronmental Performance). Therefore, Shell does not contribute to governance in this area, 
it mainly seeks to comply with existing laws. Moreover, interviews conducted with civil 
society organizations in Nigeria have shown that it is hard to evaluate Shell’s behavior 
because stakeholders seriously challenge the company’s statements and commitments, e.g. 
there are continual quarrels about compensation for communities after oil spills.  
SPDC runs some programs in the ‘socio-cultural’ dimension. One example of such a 
program is conflict resolution training for Shell’s employees to be able to better respond 
when facing conflicts in communities.61 
To sum up, Shell makes efforts to contribute to governance in some fields, as shown by 
its contribution to transparency and anti-corruption issues, as well as community devel-
opment, which is quite remarkable. In other fields, such as the environment, Shell refers 
to host state law as its main point of reference. 
Summary 
Shell is engaged in direct security governance to a limited extent, by committing to the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and by exploring possibilities for 
their implementation. The case study further reveals that Shell contributes to governance 
in the ‘political order’ and ‘socio-economic’ dimension. It also shows a positive correla-
tion between policy development and implementation and re-design of programs in the 
Niger Delta. However, Shell’s existing governance contributions are much debated and 
contentious: critical voices highlight, for example, that Shell and other oil companies are 
not active enough in compensating communities for the negative environmental effects 
caused by oil production, nor in sufficiently involving communities in decision-making 
processes and that the companies’ engagement is not designed to yield sustainable results 
(see, for example, Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria 2006: 140 f.). Others even argue that 
Shell should not be responsible for the provision of certain collective goods as that is a 
government responsibility.  
 
 
61 www.shell.com/home/content/envirosoc-
en/society/using_influence_responsibly/human_rights/training_tools_guidelines/soc_nigeria_0504.html 
(10.03.2008). 
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The case study of Shell shows that governance contributions in some fields, no gov-
ernance or even ‘bad behavior’ in other fields can go hand in hand and can change over 
time. Moreover, as governance contributions are voluntary by nature, Shell can choose 
how and in which policy fields it engages. While it has not been the focus of this short 
case study, it is widely agreed that Shell has changed its policies and has tried to institu-
tionalize new policies in its operations over the past decade. Shell’s changing approach 
can be at least partly explained by civil society pressure from above and below, i.e. the 
pressure put on the company through a global civil society campaign and the protest of 
communities and local NGOs.  
3.5 Comparison of case studies  
A comparison of our four case studies reveals corporate engagement mainly in two di-
mensions: political order and socio-economic policy fields. Shell in Nigeria additionally 
shows some limited engagement in security governance by committing to implementing 
the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. 
Table 2: Comparison of company case studies 
Corporate governance contributions to peace and security in zones of violent conflict 
Security governance Governance contributions in 
other fields 
 
Security Political order Socio-economic Socio-cultural 
Policies  X X  
1: Alpha in Rwanda 
Activities  X X  
Policies  X X  
2: Kuehne+Nagel in 
Northern Ireland Activities  X X  
Policies  X X  
3: Studiosus in Israel/ 
Palestinian Territories Activities  X X  
Policies X X X  
4: Shell in Nigeria 
Activities  X X  
Within the political order and socio-economic dimensions, an accumulation of gover-
nance contributions to certain issues can be found: in the realm of political order, compa-
nies mainly have policies and activities for human and labor rights, as well as anti-
corruption and transparency. In the socio-economic dimension, companies mostly con-
tribute to governance in three areas: environmental standards, community development, 
and equal distribution of economic goods.  
How can these findings be explained? Our first conjecture is that corporations con-
tribute most to governance in those areas that relate to their core expertise, resources and 
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interests (Wolf 2008: 236). This expertise would also give them some legitimacy for their 
engagement as they are more clearly in a position to contribute to problem solving. This 
is particularly prominent in socio-economic activities, where companies might perceive 
their expertise to be strongest, though even political order (e.g. fighting corruption and 
enhancing transparency) relates to good corporate governance to some extent. Interest-
ingly, companies themselves often do not consider their engagement in these fields, such 
as community development or ensuring transparency throughout the supply chain, to be 
‘political’ activities. The field of ‘political order’ seems to be more sensitive for corporate 
engagement. In this field companies concentrate on only a few core topics (the fight 
against corruption, or addressing human rights issues).  
In terms of security issues, three companies feel required to ensure security of their 
operations (all except K+N (NI) who operates in a highly regulated environment), and so 
are providing a private good. The provision of security as a collective good is, however, 
considered to be at the core of state responsibilities; engaging in security provision would 
then result in a deep entrapment in processes that are regarded as highly political and 
sensitive governmental responsibilities. This conflicts with the rejection of becoming a 
political actor, as expressed by many companies who perceive themselves as primarily 
economic actors. All companies perceive profit making as their primary task; through 
their policies and activities they seek to support host societies and governments, but not 
to substitute governmental action. Moreover, the level of regulation and access to gov-
ernment might influence the level of engagement in security governance even more than 
in policy fields only indirectly related to security. The example of Northern Ireland repre-
sents a state with a high level of regulation and a case where the host state is quite success-
fully in charge of security governance. In this case there is probably not much room left 
for companies to engage beyond the factory gates. If we further assume that governments 
also perceive security to be – for better or worse – at the core of their responsibility, gov-
ernments might be able and willing to regulate access for companies to this very sensitive 
and political sphere. 
Shell in Nigeria is the only case study company making a security governance contri-
bution. Three reasons might help explain Shell’s engagement. First, Shell is the only com-
pany that is very closely related to conflict (in the Niger Delta, Chapter 3.4) through its 
core business (oil production). In contrast to the other case studies, Shell can be almost 
considered to be a party to the conflict. Second, Shell has been the target of a civil society 
campaign, influencing its change in behavior over the last decade. This has also led Shell 
to revise its policies and activities for security provision (none of the other companies 
have been the target of such a broad civil society campaign). Third, engagement in secu-
rity governance might also depend on the intensity and proximity of the conflict to a 
company’s operations, which might influence its perceived need to act. The higher the 
level of violence and the more a company is affected by conflict, the more likely compa-
32 Moira Feil/Susanne Fischer/Andreas Haidvogl/Melanie Zimmer 
 
 
nies will show engagement if they want to continue their operations. This appears to par-
ticularly affect large production companies with considerable facilities on the ground. 
Alpha was in the past and Shell has for a long time been directly affected by violent con-
flict.62 However, Shell has been closely connected to the conflict, it has been affected over 
a longer period of time and has a larger infrastructure including a large net of pipelines. 
4. Conclusion and recommendations 
4.1 Clarifying expectations for and consequences of 
corporate engagement 
Companies contribute to governance in zones of violent conflict. These governance con-
tributions are at least partly the result of the growing trend towards Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility. In this sense our company case studies represent a larger trend and the more 
explicit taking over of responsibilities by companies. However, the extent and quality of 
governance contributions as well as the policy fields in which companies engage greatly 
vary. It is important to note that governance contributions of companies are voluntary by 
nature: companies can pick and choose what kind of governance issues they address in 
zones of violent conflict. Despite expectations heightened by CSR and global governance 
debates, corporate governance contributions to peace and security cannot be taken for 
granted, as the variance between companies’ engagement shows. 
Two questions can and should be discussed by public and private actors alike. First, do 
we want companies to take over governance functions in zones of violent conflict or failed 
states more generally, and what are the consequences if corporations assume this role? 
Second, if we welcome corporate contributions to governance, then what exactly do we 
expect from companies and what are companies themselves willing and able to contrib-
ute? Both sets of questions should be discussed openly and honestly by all stakeholders 
involved. 
The first question is a more fundamental and normative one, but leads to important 
questions that require further investigation. What is the responsibility of companies and 
what is the responsibility of governments? How can companies be held accountable for 
governance contributions provided? In the end, even governance contributions backed by 
companies’ best intentions might have a limited or even negative impact, possibly because 
they are badly designed or they might have unintended negative consequences. In a dem-
 
 
62 Depending on the level of alert, Studiosus has to suspend its operations. However, its local CSR projects 
remain exposed to the violent conflict. Kuehne+Nagel was not directly affected by a high level of violence 
because it only started operations after the beginning of the peace process in Northern Ireland. 
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ocratic system, it is possible to elect a new government in case the ruling government does 
not perform as expected, but there is no equivalent for companies. It is also unclear what 
consequences companies’ engagement has for the capacity of governments in zones of 
violent conflict, i.e. whether corporate engagement supports responsible governance by 
governmental actors or whether it weakens or discourages governments’ engagement as 
there is no perceived need to act if companies provide certain public goods. 
Secondly, if we agree that the private sector is a potential and important contributor to 
governance in zones of violent conflict and if we want companies to engage, we also need 
to understand how best to use its potential, and where its limits are. If some undefined 
role for the business community is merely assumed, this may lead to a rude awakening 
when the business sector turns out to be incapable or unwilling to fulfill this role. Conse-
quently, policy makers should enter into an honest dialogue with corporations on where 
corporations perceive opportunities and limits to what they are willing and able to con-
tribute. 
4.2 The need for a coordinated strategy of public actors 
What conclusions can we draw from this research for the political debate in Germany 
about the role of companies in zones of violent conflict? Unfortunately, this debate has 
more or less stagnated. This is partly due to the fact that companies perceive their en-
gagement in zones of violent conflict as too sensitive to openly discuss. A further pro-
posed argument is that there are no major German extractive companies operating in 
fragile states and therefore the topic is less relevant for German policy makers and com-
panies alike. These arguments are too short-sighted: as our case studies show, companies 
from different industries might contribute to problem solving in several policy fields with 
varying activities and in different phases of conflict. 
The stumbling of the German debate about the role of companies operating in zones 
of violent conflict, and more broadly in fragile states and developing countries might also 
be due to the fact that there are different responsibilities and signals from different minis-
tries within the German government. The German Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Preven-
tion, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building” mentions the growing im-
portance of responsible corporate engagement for crisis prevention. The German Foreign 
Ministry started several discussions on the topic during a Security Council Session and 
organized a Wilton Park conference. However, these activities lack a clear vision of pur-
pose or strategic direction. While the Foreign Ministry spearheaded these initiatives, the 
Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation is also involved as it administers 
the public private partnership (PPP) facility through which the private sector can be fi-
nanced, or developed, in developing countries (including zones of violent conflict). The 
German Technical Cooperation (gtz) also organizes the German Global Compact net-
work, which might offer a sheltered environment (Chatham House rules, etc.) for an open 
discussion amongst sufficiently high-level representatives from politics, corporations and 
civil society. This forum could be used to discuss a policy vision for business contribu-
tions to peace and security as well as to specify the potential and limits of corporate en-
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gagement in different sectors. At a more practical level, policy makers, corporations and 
NGOs can benefit from an exchange of experiences of the complex realities of violent 
conflict and post-conflict settings regarding each group’s risk, impact assessment tool and 
methodologies. Only recently, the Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs has taken over the 
lead responsibility for CSR issues. If and how the ideas for the strategy and work program 
will materialize needs to be seen.63 Furthermore, the Ministry of Economics and Technol-
ogy is responsible for the National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises.64 However, it fulfills this role very passively, even though German 
companies were explicitly named in the UN Panel of Experts’ report mentioned in the 
introduction. Currently, there is no coordinated approach to the issue of business in 
zones of violent conflict. This is not only true for Germany but for other countries as well. 
It is therefore urgently necessary for public sector actors and government agencies to 
develop a coordinated approach concerning issues such as the operations of companies in 
developing countries and especially fragile states, to clarify expectations and communi-
cate these accordingly. The public sector can then also take the initiative to establish dia-
logue with the private sector and other stakeholders and support and push companies 
operating abroad to do so in a responsible manner. 
Last but not least, it is important to place companies’ governance contributions in a 
larger perspective. The first responsibility for solving violent conflicts remains with the 
governments and parties to the conflict themselves. Individual corporations or even entire 
industry sectors can only contribute towards conflict prevention and peacebuilding. 
Moreover, transnational companies are only one group among local businesses, develop-
ment agencies, international organizations, and NGOs, etc., who can all contribute to 
governance in zones of violent conflict.  
 
 
63 See speech of Minister Olaf Scholz at the CSR Conference on 29th April 2008 in Berlin, www.bmas.de/ 
portal/25988 (15.06.2008). 
64 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises “are recommendations addressed by governments to 
multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering countries. They provide voluntary principles and 
standards for responsible business conduct in a variety of areas. Including employment and industrial re-
lations, human rights, environment, information disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, sci-
ence and technology, competition, and taxation”, www.oecd.org (01.08.2008). 
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Abbreviations 
BEIA before exceptional items and goodwill amortization 
bfai Bundesagentur für Außenwirtschaft (German Office for Foreign Trade) 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
DIN Deutsches Institut für Normierung (German Institute for Standardization) 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
DoP Declaration of Principles 
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo 
ECPAT End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for 
Sexual Purposes 
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
EMAS Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Liberation 
Forces of Rwanda) 
FPR Front Patriotique Rwandais (Rwanda Patriotic Front) 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
G8 Group of 8 
GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (Limited Company) 
GRI Global Reporting Initiative 
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical 
Cooperation) 
HIIK Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 
IRA Irish Republican Army 
ISO International Standardization Organisation 
K+N Kuehne+Nagel 
K+N (NI) Kuehne+Nagel Northern Ireland 
NEITI Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
NOG Non-governmental Organization 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PPP Public Private Partnership 
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SPDC Shell Petroleum Development Company 
TNC Transnational Corporation 
TOI Tour Operators’ Initiative 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNWTO World Tourism Organization 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
VP Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
